NEWSWEEK: You’ve been back in Iraq for almost a month. What’s changed?
Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno: A lot has changed since the last time I left. The biggest change is the influx and participation of Iraqi security forces. The development of the Iraqi army, the development of their ability to lead operations in Iraq, all of those things are really significant. The other thing that’s changed is we now have an elected government for the first time, a sovereign government, who are working as hard as they can to try to answer to a populace. One negative thing I would say, there’s clearly been an uptick in sectarian violence, which has added to the complexity of situation here and that’s a significant change over the last several months.
Do you feel that the nature of the conflict has changed? Are you fighting a different war?
It always continues to progress significantly and the environment changes as you go forward. This is a counterinsurgency, trying to stand up the government. You now have different groups who understand there is going to be an elected government here, and in many ways, they’re trying to vie for power within Iraq. And they’re using a variety of means to do that. One is by inciting sectarian violence. Another is by attacking Iraqi civilians. Another is trying to force the Coalition out before the government can be properly set up, before they can operate in a way that they will no longer need assistance. This is all being done because they want to get back into power, whether it be the old regime, Sunni insurgents or Al Qaeda trying to establish a caliphate, or some on the Shiite side of things that want to have a bigger say in the future of Iraq. That’s what makes this extremely more complex than this has been in the past. It’s not simply Sunni insurgents or Al Qaeda that we’re fighting anymore. Fighting is the wrong term. We’re trying to influence [Iraqis] to operate within the confines of the government.
How has your thinking evolved?
It’s based on the environment and what’s going on. When I was here the first time, we didn’t have a government, we weren’t even close to elections. We were trying to provide security in a local kind of way. We’ve now really transitioned. We’re now assisting the government to become capable and legitimate to its own people. Our role in that is getting the Iraqi security forces to provide security for the populace. We have to do this while fighting a counterinsurgency. What you have to be able to do is a three-pronged mission: One is to train Iraqi security forces to be able to conduct and provide security for the populace. Second, we have to fight a counterinsurgency against Sunni insurgents and Shiite extremists. Finally, we have to fight Al Qaeda, we have to make sure they’re not able to make a foothold anywhere in the Middle East to establish what they consider to be their caliphate. That’s what changed, it’s more complex.
How do you describe you own leadership style?
The most important thing to is to empower my subordinates. I think it’s especially important in Iraq, because each area is so much different then the other. My philosophy is we’re here in order to enable the multinational divisions around this country to do their job. The second thing I’ve always said, and I think some people confuse this, is that I’m aggressive in everything I do. I’m aggressive in playing basketball or golf. That’s my personality. But aggressive doesn’t necessarily mean kinetics. It’s about being aggressive and accomplishing the mission. I’m not afraid to take risks, but calculated risks. That’s what I consider to be my leadership style. I’m dogged in the things I do. I have a sense of purpose about what I do.
Your critics say that when you were with the 4th Infantry Division, you were overly aggressive.
A lot of the problem with some of the reporting I’ve seen is that it’s too anecdotal. They take a few minor anecdotes and then they imply they understand exactly what occurred in a certain area. Anyone who spent any time at all with the 4th ID realized it wasn’t just a kinetic fight. We did the full spectrum—economic, diplomatic, governmental and military operations. Did we learn from what we did? Absolutely. We stood up three separate governments in three separate provinces. We spent significant money, more money than any other unit while we were here. We executed more projects than anyone else. All of that has been forgotten and pushed aside. The other thing I would say is our operations were always transparent to the media. The focus was in Baghdad, in Mosul, in Basra. Very few people focused on what was going on [in the areas] between Baghdad to Mosul, out to the Iranian border, until we captured Saddam Hussein and everybody focused on us.
You said recently that we need to “change the dynamics” in Iraq.
I agree with the lines we’re going on. It’s clear you cannot solve this problem militarily. You have to have the combination of military, economic and diplomatic things that we have to do. We have to change the dynamic to where the Iraqis are capable of securing the population, of protecting the population. We have to change the dynamic of sectarian violence, or reduce that dynamic. We can do that through a variety of means. Some will be military; some will be diplomatic—creating a militia policy; some will be economic—creating jobs. We have failed at creating jobs. We’ve not been able to create long-term jobs.
I was in Basra today and they told me JAM [Jaish Al Mehdi, or the Mehdi Army militia] pays people $500 per assault to attack coalition forces down in Basra. They also said if they got a permanent job they would work for less, they’d rather have a job at $400 a month that’s safer. That’s the dynamic we deal with. That’s what we have to change. The problem we have is that the newly elected Iraqi government is trying to stand up; [we’ve done] nothing to connect that Iraq government to an Iraqi individual on the street. We have not done local elections, so there’s no local representation. We have not provided security forces that are competent yet, we have not yet created jobs they can keep for a period of time. We have to shorten that gap between the Iraqi government and the Iraqi individual on the street. It takes time for a brand-new government to do that, and we have to help them to do all of that.
How does the Iraqi government break the cycle of violence?
There’s always been violence in Iraq. There was violence before we got here, and there will be violence after we leave. What we have to do is ensure a democratic, elected government can handle that violence. What we don’t want is the way it was handled before, with a brutal dictator. We have to teach them to handle this violence that will occur here, that’s natural, in my mind, to this society. We’re making great strides. It takes more time.
Do you support the idea of troop surge?
I’ve worked several courses of action. I’m not sure surge is the right term. Some include the use of more forces, some don’t. I’ve forwarded those to people above me to make that decision, and when it comes back, I will execute it.
Will the extra troops be devoted to Baghdad?
I’m not going to comment on that now. When I can, I will talk about it.
Did you present your plans to Defense Secretary Robert Gates on his recent visit?
When both him and General Casey were here, I had my opportunity to talk to them, provide them my opinion, on what I thought was the best course we had and why. They listened very intently, over a couple days, and they were very receptive. [They were] clearly in the receiving mode so they could gather information and go back to Washington to make an informed decision.
You’ve said you had a personal stake in this war. Your son was seriously injured. How has that changed your feeling about war?
There’s nothing that’s more personal than losing soldiers or soldiers being injured, whether they’re your son or not. Every soldier who’s injured or killed, it’s personal. You might not know where they’re from, [but] it’s personal. And we’re losing too many soldiers, I’m not happy about it. With my son, we always knew what the costs were, my wife and I and my son, too, He understood. He does not feel sorry for himself. He is moving on with his life—he’s fully recovered. He’s lost his left arm, you are in the room with [him] for five minutes, you don’t even notice he doesn’t have an arm. He’s done several triathlons. We played touch football before I came over here. He does everything he wants to do.
You’ve noted earlier that many of your soldiers are on their second or third tours. What does this experience bring to your command?
It makes a big difference. They understand the culture, they understand the personalities involved. They understand the nature of the conflict, they understand how the conflict has progressed over time. It helps us to get transition much quicker when we come in, it enables [us] to give a quicker grasp on how things are going and how you are operating. In a lot of ways it’s an extremely positive thing. The other thing I say all the time, is we have a stake in this. We’ve given a lot of our time and our sacrifice for Iraq to be successful, and we think it’s something absolutely necessary for the future of United States and the future of our security. We really have a stake in being successful.
How big of a threat is Al Qaeda here now?
The only comment I would make is that this has long-term ramifications for our security. People say they don’t understand that. I’m not talking about why we got here or why we started. The bottom line is: If you allow Al Qaeda to establish a foothold here, in a country as rich with oil as Iraq and what they would do with oil and the revenues supporting Al Qaeda or some other extremist organizations, the implications for us and a lot of other people [are serious]. I think people need to understand that.
